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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA).1 ERISA was designed to regulate employee benefit
plans and govern the conduct of fiduciaries in control of such plans.
2
Fiduciary decisions to deny benefit claims have traditionally been
treated with deference by the judiciary.3 The question of exactly how
much deference should be granted, however, has been answered in
Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988), and in
scattered sections of the I.R.C. (1988))[hereinafter ERISA].
2. ERISA §§ 401-414 (1988), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1988).
3. For the purposes of this Note, the term "fiduciary" shall be used interchangeably
with the terms "trustee" and "administrator." These terms refer to individuals
who exercise discretion in deciding whether to deny a benefit claim. A thorough
discussion of fiduciaries is contained in H. Stennis Little, Jr. & Larry T.
Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAn. L. REv.
1, 12-13 (1977). For an analysis of the deference granted by courts to benefit
claim decisions, see Part III-B.
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various ways. Courts usually have given complete deference to a deci-
sion to deny benefits unless the claimant was able to show the fiduci-
ary acted arbitrarily or capriciously.4 In July 1992, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals broke this trend in Salley v. E.. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. S when it reversed the ERISA plan administrator's decision to
deny benefits. In Salley, the court held the fiduciary, E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. (DuPont), abused its discretion in making its decision
because it failed to adequately investigate the circumstances before
denying benefits.6
The Fifth Circuit's decision reversed the trend of deference courts
traditionally had given to fiduciaries. According to the court, DuPont
abused its discretion when it relied upon the recommendations of two
people who had not obtained enough necessary information about the
patient.7 In its defense, DuPont argued the court's review of its deci-
sion should be based only upon the facts DuPont knew at the time it
made its decision.8 The plaintiff, Danielle Salley, contended instead
that DuPont had a duty to discover all the relevant facts.
Danielle was a psychiatric patient at DePaul Hospital in Coving-
ton, Louisiana. DuPont paid for her treatment under an ERISA plan
it had established.9 On October 11, 1990, DuPont determined that
Danielle's treatment was no longer medically necessary and termi-
nated her benefits.O Generally, courts would have agreed with Du-
4. See Jocelyn Hunter, The Practical Labor Lawyer, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 403
(1991); Jaime R. Ebenstein, The Judicial Standard of Review Under ERISA, FOR
TmE DEFENSE, July 1991, at 9, 9. ("Prior to the United States Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Firestone v. Bruch, the law was well established that a high
level of deference was applicable to decisions made by plan administrators and
fiduciaries under ERISA."). See also Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc.,
986 F.2d 1322, 1324 (10th Cir. 1993)(stating arbitrary and capricious standard of
review applied to administrator's refusal to pay lump sum benefit and reversing
district court); Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 975 F.2d 1479, 1486
(10th Cir. 1992)(stating administrator's decision that heart failure not "bodily in-
jury" within meaning of policy not arbitrary or capricious); Jung v. FMC Corp.,
755 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1985)(holding refusal to pay was not arbitrary, capri-
cious, or contrary to law in class action by former employees to severance pay
under employer's welfare benefit plan); Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 653 F.2d
424, 428 (10th Cir. 1981)(holding the fund's finding as to plaintiff's ineligibility
was not arbitrary or capricious as a matter of law in action by union members to
recover benefits under pension plan).
5. 966 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1992).
6. Id. at 1015-16.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1015.
9. Id. at 1012. DuPont established its Hospital Medical-Surgery Coverage Policy in
accordance with ERISA. At all relevant times Connecticut General administered
the Plan, and DuPont reimbursed Connecticut General the full costs of medical
claims. DuPont also contracted with Preferred Health Care to manage the indi-
vidual cases.
10. Id. at 1013.
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Pont's contention and reviewed its decision under an abuse of
discretion standard based only upon information known to the fiduci-
ary at the time of the decision. The Fifth Circuit instead allowed the
district court to review the new information and found that DuPont, in
its capacity as fiduciary, abused its discretion by failing to obtain that
information before denying benefits.11L
The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. BruchL2 in its examination of DuPont's decision under
the abuse of discretion standard. Relying upon Firestone, the court
first determined whether the fiduciary of the plan, DuPont, had the
ability to determine eligibility or construe the terms of the plan.13
Next, since DuPont had the power to construe the terms of the plan,
the court reviewed DuPont's disputed benefit claim decision under the
typically deferential abuse of discretion standard of review.14 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit considered several factors in its analysis of whether
DuPont's decision to deny benefits was an abuse of discretion, includ-
ing whether DuPont acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 15
This Note will critically analyze the Fifth Circuit's reasons for de-
creasing the level of deference used to review the decisions of benefit
plan fiduciaries. The evolution of the deferential "arbitrary and capri-
cious" or "abuse of discretion" standard of review will be traced from
its inception through its less deferential definition in Salley. This
Note will first conclude that the current, deferential interpretation of
the abuse of discretion standard of review is seriously flawed. Second,
this Note will contend that despite the increased time and cost con-
straints that could accompany de facto ERISA plan administration by
the courts, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Salley is a much-needed
check on the power of fiduciaries.
II. BACKGROUND
Jack Salley, a retired employee of DuPont, participated in the hos-
pital medical-surgical coverage plan DuPont had formed in accordance
with the terms of ERISA.16 His fifteen-year-old daughter, Danielle,
11. Id. at 1015. The Fifth Circuit contradicted its own precedent with the ruling. In
Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985), the court held
that the district court's decision whether the plan administrator abused his dis-
cretion must be based upon the facts known to the administrator at the time the
decision was made.
12. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). See Noel C. Capps, Note, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch: Are Lower Courts Following the United States Supreme Court Decision in
ERISA Benefit Determinations? 31 WAsHuRNU L.J. 280 (1992), for an excellent
discussion of the case.
13. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
14. Id. at 1014-15.
15. Id. at 1014.
16. Id. at 1012.
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was covered under the plan as his dependent. Danielle had a history
of emotional disabilities, drug abuse, and depression, which had
caused her to be an inpatient three times at DePaul Northshore Hos-
pital in Covington, Louisiana.17 Each time, Danielle was under the
care of Dr. Gordon Blundell, a psychiatrist in charge of the hospital's
adolescent unit.' 8 DuPont paid for Danielle's treatment during her
first two stays in the hospital under the ERISA plan.' 9 During her
third stay, DuPont concluded that Danielle's treatment was no longer
medically necessary and terminated her benefits.20 Danielle and her
father brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana to recover the costs of Danielle's hospitalization
during that period.21
During her first two visits, Danielle attempted to escape, exper-
ienced episodes of head-banging, and displayed suicidal tendencies.
22
She nevertheless improved during each visit. However, as soon as she
was released she would "recompensate," or revert back to her old be-
havior.23 Dr. Blundell thus determined that Danielle could not live
with her parents or attend public schools. 2 4 Concerned about Dani-
elle's continual admissions and releases from the hospital, Dr. Blun-
dell worked with DuPont's plan administrators to "flex" the benefits,
or modify the terms of the coverage. 25 When Danielle was admitted to
DePaul hospital for the second time, the Salleys and hospital employ-
ees attempted to locate a less restrictive environment for Danielle.26
They considered several boarding schools, but were unable at that
time to find a school that could meet Danielle's needs. 27 As a result,
they released Danielle to attend public school, where she subsequently
recompensated. 28
Danielle was readmitted to DePaul Hospital on September 10,
1990, for the third time. Her condition quickly restabilized.29 Dr.
17. Id. at 1012-13.
18. Id. at 1013.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. "A 'benefits flex is a health insurance industry practice in which the parties
amend or modify the policy's coverage benefits in order to accommodate a contin-
gency that the original contract did not address specifically." Id. Despite the fact
that the policy does not allow the treatment provided under its terms, the treat-
ment is mutually beneficial because the insurer reduces its payout expense
through less expensive treatment while the insured receives the coverage de-
sired. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Blundell wrote at that time that Danielle was beginning "to function
at the highest level she ever has in life."3o On September 28, 1990,
Dr. Blundell talked to Ron Schlegel, a case manager with Preferred
Health Care (Preferred).31 DuPont had contracted with Preferred to
manage the individual cases, and Schlegel was the person assigned by
Preferred to handle Danielle's case since her first admission.32 Dr.
Blundell told Schlegel about Danielle's marked improvement, but in-
sisted she would regress if released.33 In accordance with Preferred's
procedures, Schlegel sent Danielle to Dr. Satwant Ahluwalia to deter-
mine the medical necessity of her treatment.3 4 This determination
was made because the DuPont plan pays only for expenses that are
"medically necessary," although it never defines the phrase.35
Dr. Ahluwalia, a psychiatrist and regional director at Preferred,
also had been involved with the case since Danielle's first admission.36
Dr. Ahluwalia had never examined Danielle nor had she reviewed her
medical records from the second or third admissions.37 She had re-
viewed only the records from Danielle's first admission.38 Dr. Blun-
dell and Dr. Ahluwalia discussed Danielle's treatment on October 2,
1990.39 Dr. Blundell told Dr. Ahluwalia that Danielle was stabilizing
and would be able to leave the hospital soon. Dr. Blundell also said he
wanted to avoid a "revolving door" pattern of admissions.40 Dr.
Ahluwalia said that DuPont planned to terminate Danielle's benefits
for inpatient hospitalization on October 11, 1990.41 Dr. Blundell did
not agree with this release date.42
The Salleys brought suit challenging DuPont's termination of ben-
efits from October 11, 1990 through January 25, 1991, when Dr. Blun-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Preferred also qualifies as a fiduciary under ERISA. "[A] person is a fiduciary
with respect to a plan to the extent... he exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any au-
thority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets . . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 1002 (21)(A)(1988).
33. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1992).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also Richard G. Mandel, Must Claims Denials Be Upheld Unless Arbi-
trary and Capricious-What Standard of Review Applies to Group Policies Issued
to ERISA Plans?, 19 FoRUM 457 (1984)(noting the terms of pension plans are
typically vague, producing varied results in courts).
36. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th Cir. 1992).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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dell released Danielle.43 Danielle subsequently enrolled in the
Darrow School in New York, where the environment was more likely
to be conducive to her psychological stability.44 The district court con-
cluded that DuPont abused its discretion when it terminated benefits
for Danielle's inpatient hospitalization and found the company liable
for her hospital bills from October 11, 1990 through January 25,
1991.45 DuPont appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, alleging that the district court erred in
holding that DuPont had abused its discretion.46
In affirming the district court's ruling, the Fifth Circuit gave Du-
Pont's decision to deny benefits less deference than fiduciary decisions
traditionally had been given by other circuits.47 The court followed
the analysis outlined by the Supreme Court in Firestone and first de-
termined whether DuPont had discretionary authority as plan admin-
istrator to determine eligibility for benefits or construe the terms of
the ERISA benefit plan.48 Under the rule in Firestone, if the plan
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority, an abuse
of discretion standard is applied.49 If the plan does not give the ad-
ministrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibil-
ity for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan, Firestone holds
that a less deferential de novo standard should be applied.50
In applying the abuse of discretion standard, a court must analyze
whether the administrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously.51 Here,
the policy stated that the DuPont "Employee Relations Department
shall be responsible for development of procedures to implement the
policy, for interpretation of policy, and for coordination of administra-
43. Id. "In accordance with an agreement between the parties, DuPont paid Dani-
elle's hospitalization expenses through November 20, 1990, although DuPont
challenge[d] whether the plan required it to make the payments." Id. n.1.
44. Id. at 1013.
45. Id. at 1014
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 3-11, and accompanying text.
48. A denial of benefits "is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit
plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eli-
gibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Salley v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992)(quoting Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
49. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Counts v. Kissack Water and Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322, 1324 (10th
Cir. 1993)(applying arbitrary and capricious standard of review to administra-
tor's refusal to pay lump sum benefit); Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 975 F.2d 1479, 1486 (10th Cir. 1992)(reviewing administrator's decision
that heart failure is not "bodily injury" within meaning of policy under arbitrary
or capricious standard).
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tion."52 The Fifth Circuit has applied the abuse of discretion standard
to similar language.53
The Salleys contended a de novo review should have been used in-
stead of the abuse of discretion standard.54 They argued that since
DuPont contracted with Preferred Health Care for medical necessity
reviews, DuPont was not exercising its discretion under the terms of
the plan.55 The court disagreed, noting that the contract between Du-
Pont and Preferred stated-"DuPont reserves final authority to author-
ize or deny payment for services to beneficiaries of a plan."56
Furthermore, DuPont had exercised final authority in denying Dani-
elle's benefits.57 The Salley's argument would ultimately be rendered
unnecessary, of course, when the court construed the supposedly def-
erential abuse of discretion standard of review in a less than deferen-
tial manner.
While the Fifth Circuit used the traditionally more deferential
abuse of discretion standard, its use of that standard deviated mark-
edly from the universal interpretation given to abuse of discretion by
the judiciary. At the heart of the change was the court's decision to
require DuPont to obtain all the necessary information regarding Da-
nielle's situation before denying benefits.58 Previously, the court had
followed its own precedent and that of other jurisdictions by basing its
review of ERISA plan benefit denials solely upon information known
to the administrator at the time he or she made the decision.59 In
Salley, the court considered information about Danielle's second and
third admissions that the administrators had not considered. Specifi-
cally, neither Schlegel nor Dr. Ahluwalia ever examined Danielle, and
neither one obtained the records from Danielle's second or third ad-
missions to DePaul hospital.6o
52. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
53. See Lowry v. Bankers Life & Casualty Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 524-25
(5th Cir.) (granting the plan committee the power to "interpret and construe" the
plan was sufficient to apply the abuse of discretion standard), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 852 (1989); Batchelor v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 861 Pen-
sion and Retirement Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1989)(finding administra-
tor given discretion when plan stated the trustees had "full and exclusive
authority to determine all questions of coverage and eligibility .... They ... have
full power to construe the provisions of this Agreement, [and] the terms used
herein .... ."). In a later case, Wildbur v. Arco Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637 (5th
Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit also applied the abuse of discretion standard to lan-
guage which gave the administrator power to "make an independent determina-
tion of the applicant's eligibility for benefits under the Plan."
54. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
55. Id. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1015.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Courts, then, are faced with difficult decisions when deciding
whether to defer to fiduciary decisions. To determine whether grant-
ing more or less deference to fiduciary decisions under the abuse of
discretion standard of review is based on better reasoning, it is neces-
sary to (1) examine the evolution of the abuse of discretion standard;
(2) examine the post-Firestone cases where the circuits have used the
abuse of discretion standard and shown great deference to fiduciary
decisions; and (3) critically analyze the reasoning behind the Salley
court's decision not to follow those holdings, setting forth which level
of deference is most strongly supported.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Evolution of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review
The provisions of ERISA do not define a standard of review for
courts to use in reviewing the decisions of benefit plan fiduciaries.61
As a result, courts have overwhelmingly turned to an arbitrary and
capricious analysis since ERISA's adoption in 1974.62 Prior to that
time the federal government had no comprehensive method of regulat-
ing employee pension and benefit plans.63 The major vehicle for plan
regulation was section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (LMRA).64 The terms of the LMRA also failed to provide a
judicial mechanism for the review of benefit decisions by plan authori-
ties. Courts responded by developing a "structural defect" analysis to
review the decisions of plan fiduciaries. This analysis evolved into the
arbitrary and capricious test used by courts today.
Section 302 applies only to union-negotiated pension trusts and
prohibits employer payments to labor representatives other than
those made to a bona fide pension trust fund.65 The payments must
61. Not all commentators agree with this assessment. For a different point of view
compare Bradley R. Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials
Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 ComELL
L. REv. 986 (1986), which contends that ERISA provides express comprehensive
standards for the regulation of fiduciary behavior.
62. See supra text accompanying note 50. See also Michael S. Beaver, The Standard
of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial Cases After Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Bruch: Revolution or D4jd Vu? 26 ToRT & INs. L.J. 1 (1990)(discussing the
change from an arbitrary and capricious standard to a de novo standard, as pro-
vided in Bruch).
63. Labor Management Relations Act, Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)(codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988))[hereinafter LMRAI. The act is com-
monly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act, after the names of its congressional
sponsors.
64. Funds unilaterally established by unions are outside the scope of the LMRA,
but within the scope of ERISA. See, e.g., LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c)(5)(1988); Shapiro v. Rosenbaum, 171 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Cf
ERISA §§ 402, 404, 29 U.S.C.§§ 1102, 1104 (1988).
65. LMRA § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(1988).
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be used "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees."66 Unfor-
tunately, the provision does not specifically allow enforcement against
individual plan fiduciaries.67 Under section 302 the claimant can ar-
gue only that the structure of the plan violates the "sole and exclusive
benefit" requirement. The statute will not allow direct review of the
decisions of the individual fiduciaries who are administering the plan.
The "structural defect" analysis was created by courts to hold indi-
vidual fiduciaries responsible for their misconduct.68 Under this anal-
ysis, a claimant was required to show that a specific part of the plan
denied benefits in an arbitrary and capricious manner.69 If the show-
ing could be made, a court would conclude the plan was not estab-
lished for the "sole and exclusive benefit" of its participants and
therefore was "structurally" deficient.70 A court would then review
the decision of the fiduciary who enforced the wrongful provision
under the same arbitrary and capricious standard.71
On balance, the decision of an individual fiduciary may be re-
viewed under LMRA section 302(c)(5) if a claimant can show benefits
have been denied arbitrarily or capriciously. That standard is applied
by courts through the "structural defect" analysis to determine if sec-
tion 302's "sole and exclusive benefit" requirement has been violated.
Hence, when Congress defined ERISA's fiduciary obligations with sim-
ilar language, many courts began using the arbitrary and capricious
test to review benefit claim denials under ERISA.72
66. Id.
67. See Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 427 (1959)("The legislative history [of
§ 302(c)(5)] is devoid of any suggestion that defalcating trustees were to be held
accountable under federal law, except by way of the injunctive remedy provided
in that subsection.").
68. See Burroughs v. Board of Trustees, 542 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1976)("Section
302(e) grants district courts jurisdiction to determine whether the provisions of a
given retirement fund constitute a structural defect in violation of section
302(c)(5)."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); John A. McCreary, Jr., Comment,
The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under ERISA: Its Origins and Applica-
tion, 23 DUQ. L. Rav. 1033, 1040 (1985)(describing the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review in regard to LMRA § 302(c)(5)).
69. See McCreary, supra note 68, at 1040.
70. See Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1971)("[Alrbitrary and ca-
pricious eligibility provisions might be violative of the structural requirement
that the [LMRA § 302] trust be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the
employees.").
71. McCreary, supra note 68. Not all courts, however, have accepted the "structural
defect" analysis as a means of acquiring jurisdiction over fiduciary behavior. See,
e.g., Fiorelli v. Kelewer, 339 F. Supp. 796, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1972)("To the extent that
plaintiffs argue for the existence of an independent federal remedy to correct
trust funds that do not operate to the sole and exclusive benefit of employees they
have ... failed to state a cause of action [under § 302(c)(5)].").
72. Duncan, supra note 61, at 994. Duncan points out that one early writer believed
the differences in the language-"exclusive benefit" versus "exclusive purpose of
providing benefits"-showed a congressional intention to impose more strict
[Vol. 73:932
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The arbitrary and capricious standard quickly became the univer-
sal standard of review for fiduciary benefit claim denials under ER-
ISA. The test generally has resulted in judicial deference to the
decisions of plan fiduciaries in three ways. First, courts usually defer
to a fiduciary's interpretation of specific plan language.73 Second, a
fiduciary's decision will be upheld if the decision is rational, even if the
claimant offers a similarly reasonable interpretation. Courts are not
concerned with whether a fiduciary's decision results in the best or
fairest outcome, only whether it is rational and made in good faith.74
Third, deference frequently is given to the determinations of fiducia-
ries in matters not covered by plan language and in factual findings.75
Recent decisions have begun to attack the universal application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard. The Third Circuit in 1987 de-
cided the circuit court version of Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
C0.76 In Firestone, the company provided a severance pay plan to its
employees who were entitled to benefits "if released because of a re-
duction in work force .... ."77 When Firestone sold a manufacturing
division to another company, the plaintiffs were rehired by the acquir-
ing company without an interruption in employment.78 Firestone,
standards on fiduciaries under ERISA. See also Charles B. Blakinger, Note, Fi-
duciary Standards Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
63 GEo. L.J. 1109, 1116 (1975) ("To prevent unfavorable interpretations of simi-
lar provisions in prior laws from affecting judicial construction of the new law,
Congress used different language to define the standard in [ERISA].").
73. See Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 975 F.2d 1479, 1486 (10th Cir.
1992)(stating administrator's decision that heart failure not "bodily injury"
within meaning of policy not arbitrary or capricious); Sandoval v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1992)(finding plan administrator's de-
nial of benefits not arbitrary or capricious); Gaines v. Amalgamated Ins. Fund,
753 F.2d 288 (3rd Cir. 1985)(sustaining denial of benefits because fiduciary's in-
terpretation was rational despite fact that court disagreed with the decision). See
also Atkinson v. Sheet Metal Workers' Trust Funds, 833 F.2d 864 (9th Cir.
1987)(sustaining suspension of benefits because evidence showed early retiree
had worked as heating and air conditioning mechanic); Miles v. New York State
Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 601 (2nd Cir.
1983)(holding decision that employees did not qualify for "new group" status
under terms of plan was not irrational).
74. See Beaver, supra note 62.
75. See, e.g., Burke v. American Stores Employee Benefit Plan, 818 F. Supp. 1131,
1137 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(finding of administrator showed that discharge of employee
justified denial of benefits); Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 683 F. Supp.
1220 (N.D. M1l. 1988), aff'd, 873 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1989)(affirming denial of em-
ployee's claim under ERISA because of employee's failure to provide requested
medical documentation); McHugh v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 638 F.
Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1986)(finding trustees' decision to deny shareholders, of-
ficers and directors of family-held company employee benefits was not arbitrary
or capricious).
76. 828 F.2d 134 (3rd Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
77. Id. at 146.
78. Id. at 136.
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acting as plan fiduciary, denied benefits to the claimants because they
had not become unemployed. The trial court held the Firestone plan
administrator's interpretation of the plan as requiring actual unem-
ployment was neither arbitrary nor capricious.79
While a number of other courts had used similar rationale to de-
cide cases,80 the appellate court in Firestone reworked the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review. The court noted that Firestone
could not impartially review claims when it acted as the administrator
of its own plan. Thus, the court held Firestone's decisions should be
reviewed under a less deferential de novo standard of review.S1 In
defense of its partial rejection of the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard, the court discussed the applicability of section 182 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts, which suggests courts should only be
deferential if the terms of the plan give discretion to the fiduciary.82
Other circuits also have questioned the wisdom of universally ap-
plying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. In Van Boxel
v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust,83 the Seventh Circuit held
the standard was "a range, not a point."84 The court in Van Boxel
wrote that judicial review should be less taxing in situations in which
the plan administrator was not under a conflict of interest and more
strict where a conflict was apparent.8 5 The Ninth Circuit, while fail-
ing to question the rationale for the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review, has denied judicial deference in similar circumstances.8 6
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Firestone attempted
to solve the conflict over the application of the arbitrary and capricious
79. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
80. See, e.g., Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 822 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1987);
Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1985), aff'd merm, 477
U.S. 901 (1986).
81. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 1987).
82. Id. at 141.
83. 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 1052.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir.
1986)(noting "a lesser degree of deference is also due here"); Jung v. FMC Corp.,
755 F.2d 708, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1985); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348,
1354 (9th Cir.)("We hold that the type of plan administration ... is highly proba-
tive of whether a particular decision to deny benefits was infected by its having
been made in conformity with the objectionable scheme."), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
865 (1985); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d
1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1983)("We hold that the burden shifts to the trustees to show
a reasonable purpose for the exclusion."). It will be interesting to see how the
Ninth Circuit decides Peters v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 816 F. Supp. 615
(N.D. Cal. 1993), if the case is ever appealed. In Peters, Magistrate Langford was
hardly deferential by ruling that the court's review of a denial of disability bene-
fits could not be limited to the administrative record.
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standard of review.87 The Court spurned the approaches of the vari-
ous circuits and instead held that a "denial of benefits.., is to be
reviewed under a de novo standard, unless the benefit plan gives the
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligi-
bility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."88 The Court
accepted section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts when it
analogized fiduciary benefit denials to trustee decisions. It noted that
an exercise of discretion by a trustee is not subject to control by a court
"except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion."89 The
Supreme Court thus held that two standards of review, de novo and
abuse of discretion, should replace the previously used "arbitrary and
capricious" standard.
Since Firestone, lower federal courts have struggled to define the
abuse of discretion standard of review. It is clear the standard should
be applied when the fiduciary has the power to construe the terms of
the plan. It is also clear the abuse of discretion standard of review is
meant to be similar to the arbitrary and capricious standard. It is not
yet clear whether it is equivalent to the old standard or slightly more
or less deferential. Although several post-Firestone decisions have
avoided the issue, most have found the two standards to be analogous,
including a recent Fifth Circuit decision.90 The bulk of federal court
decisions have only perfunctorily explained the connection between
the standards.91 Only a few cases and commentators have provided
thorough explanations regarding the interchangeability of the two
standards.92
B. Abuse of Discretion as a Deferential Standard
The majority of courts that have used the abuse of discretion stan-
dard to review the decisions of ERISA plan fiduciaries have been hesi-
87. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
88. Id. at 115.
89. Id. at 111 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959)).
90. For examples of courts that have avoided the question, see Jones v. Laborers
Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1990), Lowry v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 852 (1989). For examples of courts that have found the standards analo-
gous, see Wildbur v. Arco Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 635 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)("[We
detect only a semantic, not a substantive, difference in this [abuse of discretion]
label and the "arbitrary and capricious" label used in this case... ."); Brown v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1558 n.1 (11th Cir. 1990)("We
continue to use the terminology interchangeably."); Boyd v. Trustees of the
United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 60 (4th Cir.
1989)(stating "to the extent it would be arbitrary and capricious ... it would be
an abuse of discretion).
91. See, e.g., Retirement & Sec. Program v. Oglethorpe Power Corp. Retirement In-
come Plan, 712 F. Supp. 223 (D.D.C. 1989).
92. See Beaver, supra note 62.
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tant to reverse those decisions. Traditionally, the courts justify their
deference to the decisions of fiduciaries in a number of ways. First,
several courts have contended that the superior knowledge of plan ad-
ministrators as compared with judges mandates deference to the deci-
sions of the former.98 Other courts have suggested that plan
participants will not be treated similarly if courts continually reverse
the decisions of fiduciaries.94 Perhaps the best defense of judicial def-
erence was advanced by the Third Circuit in Struble v. New Jersey
Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund.95 In Struble, the court con-
trasted the strict judicial scrutiny of fiduciaries' investment decisions
with the deference given to fiduciaries' benefit claim decisions.96 The
court framed the difference in scrutiny by describing the problems
each situation creates for fiduciary loyalty:
In actions by individual claimants challenging the trustees' denial of benefits,
the issue is not whether the trustees have sacrificed the interests of the bene-
ficiaries as a class in favor of some third party's interests, but whether the
trustees have correctly balanced the interests of present claimants against the
interests of future claimants.... In such circumstances it is appropriate to
apply the more deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the trustees'
decisions. In the [trustee investment situation], the gravamen of the plain-
tiff's complaint is not that the trustees have incorrectly balanced valid inter-
ests, but rather that they have sacrificed .valid interests to advance the
interests of non-beneficiaries.
9 7
Other circuit courts reviewing fiduciary benefit decisions have fol-
lowed Struble's deference and only considered evidence that was a
part of the administrative record. In Block v. Pitney Bowes Inc.,98 for
example, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a district court de-
cision upholding an administrator's decision to terminate benefits.
The court in Block refused to consider medical records from a Social
Security Administration examination because the administrators had
not used them at the time of their decision.99 The Fourth Circuit simi-
larly ruled that ERISA plan benefit decisions may only be reviewed on
the evidence presented to plan administrators.300 In Voliva v.
93. See Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985)("[Tjhe stan-
dard exists to ensure that administrative responsibility rests with those whose
experience is daily and continual, not with judges whose exposure is episodic and
occasional."); Ponce v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 628 F.2d 537, 542
(9th Cir. 1980)("Generally speaking, trustees are knowledgeable of the details of
a trust fund . . . and thus they are in a position to make prudent judgments
concerning participant eligibility.").
94. See Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985)("To
vary the standard of judicial review . .. would only sow confusion in ERISA
95. 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 333-34.
98. 952 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
99. Id. at 1455.
100. Voliva v. Seafearers Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Seafearers Pension Plan,'0 ' the trial court was reversed because it
considered evidence outside of the administrative record to find
against the administrator.
The Sixth Circuit has similarly held that review under the abuse of
discretion standard must be limited to the record before the adminis-
trator at the time of the decision. 10 2 In Perry v. Simplicity Engineer-
ing, Div. of Lukens General Industries Inc., 0 3 the court reasoned that
if the district courts considered evidence not presented to plan admin-
istrators they would function as substitute administrators. Since Con-
gress intended for the prompt resolution of claims under ERISA, the
court wrote, anything less than judicial deference would frustrate that
purpose.' 04 The court stated that its goal was to determine only
whether the fiduciary made a correct decision, not to function as the
fiduciary. 0 5
The Seventh Circuit chose a different approach in its deference to
fiduciaries. In Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co.,106 the circuit court reversed
and remanded a disability claim denial to the district court with in-
structions to remand the case to the fiduciary to consider the new evi-
dence that had surfaced at trial. The lower court had considered this
evidence at trial in contravention of a general rule against de novo
hearings.1 0 7 The circuit court showed deference to the decisionmak-
ing power of the fiduciary by instructing that the new evidence be
heard by the fiduciary, not the district court. 0 8
On balance, courts have chosen to extend deference to plan admin-
istrators in three ways. First, courts have not permitted de novo re-
view of a plan administrator's discretionary action under the abuse of
discretion standard.109 Courts have limited the review of a plan ad-
ministrator's decision to the information used to make the decision.110
When district courts have considered matters outside of the adminis-
trative record, appellate courts have reversed."'1 As a result, plan ad-
101. Id.
102. See James v. Equicor, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
103. 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990). See also Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
925 F.2d 979, 986 (6th Cir. 1991)("[A] court may consider only the evidence avail-
able to the administrator at the time the final decision was made.").
104. Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, Div. ofLukens Gen. Indus., Inc., 900 F.2d 963, 966 (6th
Cir. 1990).
105. Id.
106. 710 F.2d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1983).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. E.g., Voliva v. Seafearers Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1988). See
George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: The Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege,
39 CATH. U. L. REv. 133 (1989).
110. Voliva v. Seafearers Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1988).
111. Id. See also Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985)("ad-
mitting into evidence matters not before the pan administrator" is error).
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ministrators have not had to be concerned with locating additional
information that might help the beneficiary because courts will only
review the administrator's decision based on the record the admims-
trator considered when the decision was made.112
Second, a plan administrator needs only minimal documentation to
avoid reversal.113 Generally, only substantial evidence, or less than a
prepondarance, is necessary to support an administrator's decision.114
Third, a plan administrator must only show a rational reason for de-
nying benefits.115 Consequently, a rational decision will not be re-
versed, even if the trial court determines that a better decision should
have been made.l1 6 Plan administrators need only show reasonable
grounds for their decisions to deny benefits. In addition, the plan ad-
ministrator has the burden of showing a rational basis for his or her
decision only when the beneficiary can make a prima facie showing
that the plan administrator's action was unreasonable.117
C. The Test in Salley
In Salley, the Fifth Circuit applied the abuse of discretion standard
because the benefit plan gave DuPont the power to construe the terms
of the plan.11s To apply the standard, the court analyzed whether the
plan administrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously.119 It is within
the framework of this analysis that the court broke new ground. Gen-
erally, courts decide whether a fiduciary has abused his or her discre-
tion based on information known to that person at the time the
112. Voliva v. Seafearers Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1988). The Tenth
Circuit recently joined those courts that refuse to consider evidence which was
not before the plan administrator with its decision in Sandoval v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1992).
113. See Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 434 (4th Cir. 1986); Jestings v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 757 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1985)(calling medical report
considerable evidence); Vorpahl v. Retirement Plan for Employees, 749 F.2d
1266, 1268 (8th Cir. 1984)(finding no substantial evidence that early service
years should count in calculating retirement benefits).
114. See Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 975 F.2d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.
1992)(ruling arbitrary and capricious conduct must be shown by administrator's
lack of substantial evidence, mistake of law, bad faith, or conflict of inter-
est)(citing Sandoval v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 380 n.4
(10th Cir. 1992); Naugle v. O'Connell, 833 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (10th Cir.
1987)(holding arbitrariness and capriciousness must be shown by administrator's
lack of substantial evidence or error of law).
115. See Flint, supra note 109, at 142.
116. Id. at 142-43.
117. Id. at 143.
118. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
119. Id.
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decision to deny benefits is made.' 20 In Salley, the Fifth Circuit ig-
nored this precedent and held DuPont had abused its discretion by
failing to obtain all the necessary information before denying Dani-
elle's benefits.' 2 ' The court justified its break from its own prior deci-
sions and those of other circuits because DuPont, in its capacity as
plan administrator, had relied upon the Schlegel and Dr. Ahluwalia
recommendations to terminate Danielle's benefits.' 22 Both of those
individuals, of course, had never examined Danielle, nor had either
one obtained the records from her second or third admissions to
DePaul hospital.' 23
In Struble, the court's argument that a fiduciary benefit claim de-
serves less judicial scrutiny than an investment decision most clearly
exposes the flaws of deferentially applying the abuse of discretion
standard.' 24 The Struble argument is problematic for several rea-
sons. First, ERISA does not limit its fiduciary provisions to invest-
ment regulation, as benefit claims are also included.' 25 Second,
Congress intended ERISA to protect the rights of individual workers
by regulating the way fiduciaries made decisions.126 Part of the prob-
lem Congress meant to correct was the deference given to these deci-
sions under the arbitrary and capricious test.' 27 Third, some
employers have incentives to limit the benefits paid to claimants.'
28
In many cases, employers attempt to limit the amount of benefits paid
to present claimants to insure adequate funds for future claimants.'
29
120. Id. See also Denton v. First Natl Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985) (stat-
ing that the court must focus on the evidence that was before the Plan Committee
when the determination was made).
121. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325
(3d Cir. 1984); Duncan, supra note 61, at 999.
125. E.g., Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., 456 F. Supp. 559, 567 (N.D. Ohio 1978)("This
pre-ERISA test ofjudicial review [the arbitrary and capricious test] is not implic-
itly approved or rejected by any part of ERISA.").
126. See MR. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641. See also Jamie L. Johnson, Comment, Judicial Review
of ERISA Plan Administration Under the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of
Review, 10 INDus. REL. L.J. 400,403 n.20 (1988)("Section 102 [of ERISA] requires
that the plan be written so as to be 'understood by the average plan participant
... [and] reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights
and obligations.' ")(quoting ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1)(1982)).
127. H.R. RnP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 10 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4641. See also H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 303
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.N. 5038, 5083 ("[Elach fiduciary of a plan must act
solely in the interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries ... to provide
benefits to these participants and beneficiaries .... ").
128. See, e.g., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Star
Co., 555 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
129. See Duncan, supra note 61, at 1001 n.76.
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Similarly, a number of employers receive any surplus in the plan after
all qualified beneficiaries have been paid.130 Once the employer's in-
centive to deny benefits is considered, it seems irrational to afford
great deference to the decisions of the employer in its role as plan
fiduciary.131
In Struble, the court's argument for a deferential interpretation of
the abuse of discretion standard of review is centered on the conten-
tion that a fiduciary denies one claimant benefits in the interests of
future claimants. In contrast, that court argues, investment decisions
should be subject to less deference because they benefit unrelated
third parties. Contrary to the guiding premise of the Struble argu-
ment, the rights of individual claimants are at least as important as
the possibility of poor investment decisions. In fact, an individual
claimant is much more profoundly affected by a denial of benefits than
by an investment loss. First, a plan beneficiary often is unable to un-
dertake or continue medical treatment once a fiduciary makes the de-
cision to deny benefits. Second, the total value of the group's
investment portfolio and the total amount of benefits may be dimin-
ished, but it is unlikely the individual beneficiary will be directly af-
fected by the decision. The effect of a benefit denial on an individual
employee or plan beneficiary will ultimately have a much more
profound effect on that person.
Justice Brennan's concurrence in a recent Supreme Court case fo-
cused on the issue. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell,132 Justice Brennan disputed Justice Stevens' statement in
dicta that ERISA's fiduciary obligations apply mostly to investment of
plan assets. Justice Brennan wrote that "[t]o the extent that the
Court suggests that administrators might not be fully subject to strict
fiduciary duties to participants and beneficiaries in the processing of
their claims ... I could not more strongly disagree."1a3 Moreover, he
noted Congress intended ERISA to incorporate the common law of
trusts.1 3 4 Since the law of trust demands that fiduciaries owe strict
duties to beneficiaries in the payment of benefits, Justice Brennan ar-
gued that fiduciaries who deny benefits should be held to a higher de-
gree of scrutiny.135 Applied to the abuse of discretion standard,
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). See Note, Participant and Beneficiary Remedies Under ER-
ISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 Com'ELL L. REV. 1014 (1986), for an analysis of the
holding of this case and its possible implications.
133. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 152 (1985)(Brennan,
J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 153 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan's argument demonstrates the inappropriateness of
extreme deference to fiduciaries benefit claim decisions.
A closer look at the intent of Congress when it passed ERISA fur-
ther supports the Fifth Circuit's decision in Salley to force fiduciaries
to take more care in their decisions. Congress designed ERISA for the
"protection of individual pension rights."13 6 This purpose is directly
contrary to blind deference to claims denials. In contrast, the holding
in Salley that employers must reasonably investigate relevant circum-
stances when making decisions aids in that purpose.'
3 7 Similarly, it
is fair to allow courts to review all the facts surrounding a denial of
benefits, not just those the plan administrator was content to use in
the decisionmaking process. The current deference of the abuse of dis-
cretion test allows fiduciaries to ignore facts that are vital to a claim-
ant's well being while preventing courts from considering those same
facts. The purpose of ERISA, to protect the individual worker, is lost
in the process.
Plan administrators generally may either rely on the treating phy-
sician's advice or independently investigate the treatment's medical
necessity. In this case, DuPont's plan administrators apparently re-
lied upon Dr. Blundell's description of Danielle as no longer suicidal or
out of control.138 The court noted that the administrators could not
rely on part of Dr. Blundell's advice and ignore his other advice.13
9
Dr. Blundell had warned Dr. Ahluwalia that he would release Dani-
elle only if there was an "iron-clad plan in hand that would assure her
structure, safety, and well being."' 40 Such a plan had not been found.
Although the court did not explain its reasoning, it arrived at the only
rational decision. It would have been inherently unfair to defer to the
DuPont fiduciary's decision when that fiduciary ignored part of Dani-
elle's doctor's advice. By the same token, if the trial court had fol-
lowed the general rule and refused to look at evidence that was not a
part of the administrative record, it would have had to affirm Du-
Pont's decision.
The hospital records from the third admission also would have
demonstrated to the administrators the medical necessity of Danielle's
inpatient hospitalization.'41 Danielle may have been stable when she
136. See supra text accompanying note 127. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1988)("[I]t is
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries... that... safe-
guards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administra-
tion of such plans ... it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries ... that minimum standards be provided assuring the equita-
ble character of such plans .... ").
137. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
141. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1992).
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was in the hospital, but as soon as she was released her condition
would quickly deteriorate.142 Dr. Blundell and the other doctors who
examined Danielle had valid reasons to believe release into an im-
proper environment would again lead to recompensation.143 DuPont
maintained that a residential care treatment would have satisfied Da-
nielle's needs.-44 Dr. Blundell agreed that a less restrictive environ-
ment could have been beneficial to Danielle, but he was against
releasing her until a suitable program could be found.145 At the time
in question, such a program could not be found.146 If Dr. Blundell had
released Danielle, she likely would have returned to her former envi-
ronment.' 47 The ERISA plan administrators at DuPont, however,
never saw the records. As the rule is generally interpreted, the court
therefore would not have been able to consider those records in its
review of DuPont's decision. The Fifth Circuit, however, properly ig-
nored the general rule and refused to defer to DuPont's attempt to
prevent the records from being admitted into evidence.
It is not difficult to imagine the problems which might occur when
courts are unable or unwilling to look at evidence that was not before
an ERISA plan administrator. In Salley, for example, the plan admin-
istrator was never actually identified. The court referred to Schlegel
and Dr. Ahluwalia because DuPont presented no evidence regarding
its decision to terminate benefits.14s The court believed that DuPont
made the final determination as to termination or continuance of ben-
efits, but did not hear specific evidence to that effect.149 In fact, the
court never knew who at DuPont made the ultimate decision to deny
Danielle's benefits.15o Similarly, no one testified as to what DuPont
did with the information provided by Schlegel and Dr. Ahluwalia.151
Consequently, the court noted that any support in the record for Du-
Pont's decision had to be found entirely in the recommendations of
Schlegel and Dr. Ahluwalia.152 Since neither person had thoroughly
examined Danielle or her records, any decision based on their recom-
mendations could have its accuracy called into question. Seen in this
light, the court's decision to grant less deference to DuPont's fiduciary
decision was clearly the most rational choice. The court needed the
142. Id. at 1015.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. Danielle enrolled in the Darrow School in New York shortly after she was
released from the hospital by Dr. Blundell.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1015 n.2.
151. Id. at 1015.
152. Id.
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new information from Danielle's second and third admissions to make
the best decision with respect to her well-being.
The Fifth Circuit may have foreshadowed its desire not to show
deference to ERISA plan administrators. In Batchelor v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,153 trustees of a union pension plan
were found to have miscalculated an employee's past service credit.
The plan granted the trustees full and exclusive authority to deter-
mine eligibility and coverage questions and the authority to interpret
the plan and determine all questions arising in the administration,
interpretation, and application of the plan.154 While the court used
the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review, it nevertheless
found the trustees' interpretation was in direct conflict with the terms
of the plan.155 The court ultimately determined an amendment to the
ERISA plan violated the terms of the statute and illegally allowed the
fiduciary to deny benefits.156
The Fifth Circuit's decisions since Salley have continued along the
same path. In Wildbur v. Arco Chemical Co.,157 the court noted that
although "we do not appear to have explicitly stated that evidence be-
yond the administrative record may be considered by a reviewing
court... our abuse of discretion analysis and the manner in which we
have applied it submits to no other reasonable interpretation."158 The
court went on to specifically hold that district courts were not confined
to the administrative record in determining whether a plan adminis-
trator abused his discretion in making a benefit determination.159
Similarly, in Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co. v. Moore,160
the Fifth Circuit held that while it would only consider "evidence that
was available to the plan administrator in evaluating whether he
abused his discretion in making [factual determinations]," it could
consider other evidence which was "unavailable to the plan adminis-
trator as it relates to his interpretation of the policy."161
IV. CONCLUSION
The current deference granted to ERISA plan fiduciaries under the
abuse of discretion standard is inappropriate and contrary to the in-
tent of the law. The current interpretation of the test is inappropriate
for three reasons. First, ERISA was designed to protect workers by
153. 877 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1989).
154. Id. at 443.
155. Id. at 448.
156. Id.
157. 974 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992).
158. Id. at 639.
159. Id.
160. 993 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1993).
161. Id. at 102.
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regulating the conduct of fiduciaries who administer benefit plans.
Unfortunately, the decisions of these fiduciaries are often granted so
much deference that their conduct is barely, if at all, regulated. Sec-
ond, their decisions only have to be rational, not the best choice. They
can base the decisions on minimal evidence. As a result, fiduciaries
are granted an enormous amount of latitude when making decisions
vital to plan beneficiaries. Third, their rulings can only be reviewed
based upon the information they used at the time they made their de-
cision. Other than in the Fifth Circuit, fiduciaries currently are not
required to conduct thorough investigations before denying benefits.
Similarly, courts are not allowed to consider evidence that is not a
part of the administrative record. In both cases, the intent of the law
is ignored and the individual worker is being denied fair treatment.
Salley reverses this trend and takes a step in the more rational
direction. It stands for the proposition that the decisions of fiduciaries
will no longer be granted unconditional deference. If a fiduciary fails
to adequately obtain the necessary information before denying bene-
fits, the decision will be overruled. ERISA was designed to protect the
individual worker. A less deferential standard of review will hold fi-
duciaries more accountable and begin to achieve that design. Ulti-
mately, a de novo standard of review for every contested benefit claim
decision would create the fairest forum for beneficiaries of ERISA
plans. For the present, however, the judiciary would be wise to follow
the lead of the court in Salley by granting less deference to the deci-
sions of fiduciaries and reviewing any evidence that was not, but
should have been, considered by the fiduciary. Concerns regarding
the increased litigation time and costs involved with establishing
courts as de facto plan administrators may have some merit. Those
concerns are best refuted by the fact that ERISA was created to pro-
tect individual workers and can only achieve that end in the future
with the aid of the judiciary.
Jon C. Bruning '94
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